



THE FINANCING OF INNOVATION: LEARNING AND STOPPING 
 
By 


















COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS 
YALE UNIVERSITY 
Box 208281 
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281 
 
http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/ The Financing of Innovation:
Learning and Stopping￿
Dirk Bergemanny Ulrich Hegez
October 2004
Abstract
This paper considers the ￿nancing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of
completion and the probability of eventual success. We distinguish between two ￿nancing modes,
namely relationship ￿nancing, where the allocation decision of the entrepreneur is observable,
and arm￿ s length ￿nancing, where it is unobservable.
We ￿nd that equilibrium funding stops altogether too early relative to the e¢ cient stopping
time in both ￿nancing modes. The rate at which funding is released becomes tighter over time
under relationship ￿nancing, and looser under arm￿ s length ￿nancing. The trade-o⁄in the choice
of ￿nancing modes is between lack of commitment with relationship ￿nancing and information
rents with arm￿ s length ￿nancing.
Keywords: innovation, venture capital, relationship ￿nancing, arm￿ s length ￿nancing, learning,
time-consistency, stopping, renegotiation-proofness.
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MOTIVATION Typically, when decisions are made to start an R&D project or an innovative
venture, much uncertainty exists about the chances of the project and about the time and capital
needed to secure success. It has been estimated that it takes about 3,000 raw ideas to eventually
achieve a single major commercially successful innovation (Stevens and Burley, 1997). Research
and development is tantamount to winnowing down a vast amount of ideas and alternatives through
trial and error, and is therefore subject to considerable variance in terms of the time and money
spent: it may be the 3rd or the 2,997th idea that, when tried out, produces a major success.
The research and development process for a new pharmaceutical product may serve as an illus-
tration. The idea for a new drug is most likely based on some initial and very preliminary research,
opening a vast ￿eld of possible combinations or ideas. The development itself requires substantial
amounts of trials and investments before the value of the initial approach can be assessed. More
information will be produced over time as to whether the project will be successful or should be
abandoned due to poor results.
The uncertainty about the time and capital required is a source of potential con￿ ict between
the ￿nanciers providing the capital and the researchers or entrepreneurs carrying out the project.
The purpose of the present paper is to study agency problems that are directly linked to the open-
endedness of the funding in R&D projects, in particular con￿ icts surrounding the timing of the
decision to terminate a research project. Venture capitalists often refer to the decision to discontinue
a projects as the most important source of con￿ ict between them and start-up entrepreneurs,
since entrepreneurs almost never want to abandon a project that is under way. Entrepreneurs
express a strong preference for continuation regardless of present value considerations under most
circumstances, be it because they are (over-)con￿dent or because they rationally try to prolong the
search, and they tend to use their discretion to (mis-)represent the progress that has been made in
order to secure further funding (Cornelli and Yosha, 2003).
Agency con￿ icts of this kind potentially occur in every situation where a researcher or entrepre-
neur uses external funding for her R&D e⁄orts, as exempli￿ed by the following three areas. First,
they will a⁄ect venture capital ￿rms ￿nancing high-tech start-ups. Empirical research on the ven-
ture capital industry reveals that venture capitalists are well aware of such problems, and that they
go to great length to build possible safeguards into their contracts.1 Second, the optimal ￿nancing
of research is also a concern for the capital budgeting for R&D expenditures process within a ￿rm.
1For example the following instruments (documented in Sahlman, 1990, Hellmann, 1998, Kaplan and Stromberg,
2002, and Gompers and Lerner, 1999): Venture capitalists retain extensive control rights, in particular rights to
claim control on a contingent basis and the right to ￿re the founding management team; they keep hard claims in
form of convertible debt or preferred stock, underpinning the right to claim control and abandon the project; and
staged ￿nancing and the inclusion of explicit performance benchmarks make it possible to ￿ne-tune the abandonment
decision.
1Third, the problems that we investigate arise also for governments, universities, research founda-
tions and other organizations that sponsor research. They need to evaluate progress of research
projects and to determine the timing for grant renewal or the decision to abandon.
In many cases, the investors in innovative projects will keep a hands-on approach on their invest-
ment. Venture capitalists are known to monitor their portfolio companies intensely, for example
by soliciting reports and by visiting the company on a monthly basis, and by being involved in
the decision making via board membership and other channels and control rights. Besides moni-
toring, venture capitalists also play an active role as advisors of start-up companies, for example
by getting involved into the recruitment of key employees and executives (Gompers and Lerner,
1999, Casamatta, 2003). In other words, the venture capital industry provides predominantly re-
lationship ￿nancing. But not all investors in innovative start-ups are in fact relationship investors.
Informal business angels have been characterized as being less involved in monitoring and to pro-
vide only limited advisory services (Barry, 1994, Fenn et al., 1995). Angel investors, who until
recently channeled more money to start-ups than formal venture capitalists, can thus be viewed as
the prototypical arm￿ s length investors in the ￿nancing of innovation.2 Recent theory papers have
cast the choice between venture capitalists and angel investors as a choice between informed and
less informed investors (Chemmanur and Chen, 2003, Leshchinskii, 2003).
The distinction between relationship investors and arm￿ s length investors is not limited to
venture capital vs. angel ￿nancing. A di⁄erence between better or worse informed investors also
arises when comparing large and experienced venture capital funds to small and young ones, close
to distant, industry specialist vs. generalist, independent vs. corporate venture fund.
The terms relationship vs. arm￿ s length funding were originally introduced to distinguish be-
tween informed commercial banks and other, less informed creditors like bondholders. In his seminal
paper, Rajan (1992) argues that relationship investors may use their exclusive knowledge to sub-
sequently extract rents from successful projects. The value of relationship bank lending has been
empirically con￿rmed (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, Berger and Udell, 1995, Degryse and Ongena,
2002). Debt in its various forms, including for example trade credit, is an important source of fund-
ing for start-up ￿rms (Berger and Udell, 1998), and credit markets o⁄er a natural choice between
relationship lending and credit with a greater informational distance.3
ANALYSIS This paper examines a stylized model of the funding of a research project where
the merit of an idea and the time and money needed for completion are uncertain. It speci￿cally
investigates how stopping decisions are taken in the presence of agency con￿ icts in the form of
2Chemmnur and Chen (2003) discuss the ￿ ow of funds estimation.
3In our model (like in countless others), debt and equity funding are indistinguishable since there is only a single
positive cash ￿ ow realization, R, that is to be split between entrepreneur and investors.
2entrepreneurial opportunism. The project will succeed with a positive probability in every period
in proportion to the volume of funds provided, so that uncertainty is represented by a simple
stochastic process. As continued research e⁄orts are undertaken and no success is forthcoming,
Bayesian learning will lead to a gradual downgrading of the belief in the project￿ s prospects. The
project ends either with a success, or it will eventually be abandoned in the light of persistent
negative news. We assume that the time horizon itself is in￿nite, to address the essence of the
uncertainty about the time to completion, but abandonment will occur in ￿nite time.
The entrepreneur controls the allocation of the funds. She can choose to invest the funds
e¢ ciently into the project or to divert them to private ends. This agency con￿ ict is rich because
of the dynamic nature of the investment problem. When diverting the funds, the entrepreneur
not only enjoys the immediate bene￿t from consuming the money meant for investment. She also
secures the option of continued funding in the future, since nothing can be learned about the project
when the funds are not invested as supposed. Thus, the entrepreneur￿ s discretion over the funds is
intimately linked to the timing of the abandonment decision.
We consider a sequence of short-term contracts which in our setting is equivalent to requiring
that the contract, short- or long-term, can be renegotiated at all times. Thus, any decision to
abandon the project after a given horizon of funding, or to reduce the speed at which funding
is released, must be time-consistent. A fundamental contribution of our analysis is the fact that
we embed the agency con￿ ict about the use of resources in the context of an open-ended funding
horizon, coupled with the requirement that any equilibrium be renegotiation-proof.
We model relationship and arm￿ s length ￿nancing by distinguishing whether the investor can or
cannot observe the entrepreneur￿ s investment decision.4 With relationship ￿nancing, the action of
the entrepreneur is observable, or more precisely ￿observable, but not veri￿able￿as it is usually de-
scribed in the incomplete contracts literature, and the environment is at all times one of symmetric
information. With arm￿ s length ￿nancing, actions by the entrepreneur are unobservable, and we
are investigating a standard moral hazard problem between investor and entrepreneur.
The basic con￿ ict between entrepreneur and investor can be described as follows. For the
entrepreneur, the project represents the possibility to win a single large prize, but also a stream of
rents that she could possibly divert to her private ends. The tension between investing and diverting
the funds is accentuated by the fact that the successful completion of the project automatically
stops the ￿ ow of funds. The direct incentives for the entrepreneur then have to be adequate to
o⁄set the possible loss in future rents, hence they have to be increasing in the volume of future
funding that the entrepreneur expects in equilibrium.
The combination of an in￿nite funding horizon and contract renegotiation becomes truly im-
portant in light of this fundamentally intertemporal nature of the incentive problem. The longer
4We would like to thank Patrick Bolton for a suggestion to include this distinction.
3the funding horizon, the more valuable is the entrepreneur￿ s option to increase the probability of
access to future funding by diverting funds. The natural candidate for a contractual remedy would
be to declare ex ante that no ￿nancing will be provided after a certain funding horizon, but such a
commitment would necessarily not be time-consistent by the nature of the problem presented here.
In the equilibrium analysis, we examine how entrepreneur and investor share the proceeds of the
project as a function of the elapsed time, and whether funding is released at the e¢ cient rate and
until the e¢ cient stopping point, by ￿rst considering relationship ￿nancing (observable actions).
The information about the project is then always common for both parties and funding renewal
is negotiated under symmetric information. As funding continues and the outlook becomes less
promising, the participation constraint of the investor leaves less for the direct incentive of the
entrepreneur. At some point, this residual will fall short of what is needed to provide incentives.
The only possible solution is that the investor slows down the release in funds, which happens in
the form of a reduced funding rate by the investor. This reduces the entrepreneur￿ s option value
of prolonging the project, and the incentive constraint can be met again. As time goes on and the
posterior belief decreases, the slowdown in funding becomes more serious, and funding will come
down to a trickle as the belief approaches the ￿nal abandonment point, which is too early relative
to the e¢ cient policy.
As we consider the case of arm￿ s length ￿nancing (actions are unobservable), we need to take
into account the dynamics of the moral hazard problem. The moral hazard problem about the
entrepreneur￿ s decision in the current period translates into an adverse selection problem about
beliefs in future periods. For the entrepreneur, control over the investment ￿ ow means also control
over the information ￿ ow, knowing that the private beliefs of entrepreneur and investor about the
project can diverge. We ￿nd that while the tension between immediate incentives and intertempo-
ral rents remains, there is one subtle, yet important di⁄erence in the value of a deviation for the
entrepreneur. With symmetric information, the entrepreneur could renew his proposal after a devi-
ation based on the belief held in the previous period, since nothing in the perception of the project
has changed on either side. In contrast, with unobservable actions, the investor will automatically
downgrade his belief after a deviation and insist in the continuation game to be compensated on
the basis of his belief, which is more pessimistic than warranted. This change in the belief limits
the maximal ￿nancing horizon, which relaxes the incentive constraint and facilitates funding. On
the other hand, the entrepreneur commands an additional information rent since she controls the
information ￿ ow.
We are then in a position to compare the overall e¢ ciency of arm￿ s length and relationship
￿nancing. We identify the following basic trade-o⁄: Under relationship ￿nancing, there is no
informational asymmetry, and the information rent that compensates the entrepreneur for her
control of the information ￿ ow can be saved; but under arm￿ s length funding, the investor is
committed to stick to a ￿nite stopping time, reducing the option value of the entrepreneur to
4prolong the project through deviations. We ￿nd that the second e⁄ect always dominates and arm￿ s
length contracts allow for a higher project value.
The equilibrium is shown to be unique in both cases. We require the equilibrium to be weakly
renegotiation-proof, meant to capture the inability of entrepreneur and investor to prevent recon-
tracting or renegotiation. More precisely, we ￿rst derive the unique Markov equilibrium and then
show that this equilibrium is identical to the equilibrium derived under the renegotiation-proofness
assumption. We argue that our results are consistent with the typical ￿nancing cycle of start-up
￿rms where relationship ￿nanciers are gradually replaced by arm￿ s length sources.
In conclusion, the fundamental contracting di¢ culty in this paper comes about by the combi-
nation of an in￿nite funding horizon and the possibility of renegotiation. As our analysis shows,
the only way to resolve these con￿ icts is via delays in the ￿nancing of innovation - in form of a
slowdown in the release of funds. The temporal occurcence of these delays depends on the informa-
tional relationship between investor and entrepreneur: it will be frontloaded for pro￿table projects
under arm￿ s length funding, and backloaded in all other cases.
RELATED Literature Besides the papers already mentioned, in particular the papers on rela-
tionship ￿nancing, our paper is related to three distinct strands of the literature. First, it is linked
to the literature on the ￿nancing of innovation and venture capital, in particular papers focusing
on the entrepreneur￿ s discretion to in￿ uence the stopping decision in innovative and risky projects.
Qian and Xu (1998) observe that soft budget constraint problems of this kind are endemic in bu-
reaucratic systems of R&D funding. Cornelli and Yosha (2003) address the window-dressing of
performance signals to have the project continued. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) note that hav-
ing multiple investors may be a device to mitigate this problem. In the venture capital literature,
moral hazard-driven stopping problems have served as the background to explain the use of such
remedies as stage ￿nancing, convertible securities and the dismissal of incumbent managers (e.g.
Repullo and Suarez, 1999, Hellmann, 1998). But all contractual devices of this sort are in principle
open to renegotiation. To fully account for the relevant time-consistency issues, it seems desirable
to go beyond the static (two or three-period) models employed in this literature. The question is
what happens if the horizon is extended and time-consistent devices to commit to an abandonment
decision are not available. This is the starting point of our paper.
Second, our problem is related to a strand of the incomplete contracts literature that investigates
what is known as the strategic default problem (e.g. Hart and Moore, 1994, Hart and Moore, 1998,
Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). In this literature, the agent can threaten to default on obligations
despite being solvent, and the principal￿ s power to liquidate assets or dismiss the agent enforces
payment. Our model is di⁄erent in that there is only a single cash ￿ ow, with uncertain arrival time,
and that the outlook of the project under consideration deteriorates over time. We are closest in
5spirit to three in￿nite horizon models of strategic default. Gromb (1994) investigates repetitions of
projects ￿ la Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and ￿nds that the e¢ ciency of the best feasible contracts
deteriorates as the horizon of such repeated investments is extended. DeMarzo and Fishman (2000)
address long-term contracts and the agent￿ s ability to save. In Fluck￿ s (1998) repeated game only
in￿nite maturity outside equity can solve the agent￿ s as well as the principal￿ s incentive problem.
Neher (1999) considers a variant of Hart and Moore (1994) where delay via staged ￿nancing enables
the built-up of collateral, in contrast to our model where delay reduces the present value of future
rents.
Third, our paper is clearly related to literature on the advantages of arm￿ s length relationships
in agency models. Our paper is closest to CrØmer (1995) who shows that better information about
the agent￿ s circumstances makes it more di¢ cult for the principal to commit to sanctions. Marquez
(1998) explores this idea in the context of ￿nancial contracts and relates it to competition as an
alternative commitment device.
In an earlier paper, Bergemann and Hege (1998) undertake a preliminary analysis of the same
basic model, but the present paper goes beyond the earlier paper in two important dimensions.
First, it thoroughly allows for renegotiation which is entirely ignored in the earlier paper. Renego-
tiation is at the heart of our dynamic agency problem since the entrepreneur would like to commit
ex ante to a ￿nite funding horizon when she encounters ￿nancing constraint, but such a commit-
ment would necessarily be time-inconsistent. Second, Bergemann and Hege (1998) examine only
the case of unobservable actions, whereas the present paper accounts for relationship funding which
is more typical for the funding of innovative projects and puts the comparison between relationship
and arm￿ s length ￿nancing at center stage.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is formally presented in Section 2. We consider
a two period version of our model in Section 3. The equilibrium analysis begins in Section 4
with observable actions of the entrepreneur. Section 5 examines equilibrium ￿nancing when the
allocation decision of the entrepreneur is unobservable to the investor. The structure and e¢ ciency
of the equilibria under symmetric and asymmetric information are compared in Section 6. Section
7 presents some concluding remarks. The proofs of all results are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model and First Best Policy
The project, the investment technology and the evolution of the posterior beliefs are described in
subsection 2. In subsection 2, we introduce the contracting problem. In subsection 2, we derive the
e¢ cient stopping posterior.
6PROJECT with Unknown Returns The entrepreneur owns a project with unknown return.
The project is either ￿good￿with prior probability ￿0 or ￿bad￿with prior probability 1 ￿ ￿0. If
the project is ￿good￿ , then the probability of success in a given period is proportional to the funds
invested into the project in that period. If the project is ￿bad￿ , then the probability of success is
zero independent of the investment ￿ ow. The project can at most generate a single success which
generates a ￿xed monetary return R > 0.
More precisely, if the project is ￿good￿ and the project receives an investment ￿ ow of c￿,
with c > 0, then the probability of success is given by ￿. The parameter c thus represents the
constant marginal cost of increasing the success probability. We assume that ￿ 2 [0;￿] with ￿ < 1.
In consequence the project can never succeed with certainty in any given period. If the project
succeeds, then a cash ￿ ow R is realized and distributed among the parties, and the game ends
immediately. We refer to an investment ￿ ow ￿ = ￿ as full or maximal funding, and an investment
￿ < ￿ as limited or restricted funding.
The uncertainty about the nature of the project is resolved over time as the ￿ ow of funds either
produces a success or leads to a stopping of the project. The time horizon is discrete and in￿nite,
time periods are denoted by t = 0;1;:::;1, the discount factor is ￿ 2 (0;1).
The investment process represents an experiment which produces information about the future
likelihood of success. The current information is represented by the posterior belief ￿t that the
project is good. The evolution of the posterior belief ￿t; conditional on no success in period t, is
given by Bayes￿rule as a function of the prior belief ￿t and the investment ￿ ow ￿t:
￿t+1 =
￿t (1 ￿ ￿t)
1 ￿ ￿t￿t
. (1)
The posterior belief ￿t decreases over time if success doesn￿ t arise. The decline in the posterior
belief is stronger for larger investments ￿ ows ￿t as the agents become more pessimistic about the
likelihood of future success. The posterior belief changes only slowly for very precise beliefs about
the nature of the project, i.e. if ￿t is either close to 0 or 1. Correspondingly, the event of no success
is most informative with di⁄use beliefs, or when ￿t is close to 1
2.
We refer to the special case of ￿0 = 1 as the ￿certain success project￿or short ￿certain project￿ .
With ￿0 = 1, the posterior never changes as the agents do not entertain the possibility that the
project might be bad and ￿t remains at ￿t = 1 for all t ￿ 0. For this obvious reason, we refer to
the case of ￿0 = 1 as the ￿certain success project￿or short ￿certain project￿ . As a consequence of
the constant posterior beliefs of ￿t = 1 for all t ￿ 0, if funding at ￿0 = 1 can be provided at the
maximal level ￿, then it will be provided forever until the project succeeds, hence ￿certain project￿ .
CONTRACTING The entrepreneur has initially no wealth and seeks to obtain external funds
to realize the project. Financing is available from a competitive market of investors, which is
7represented in the model by a single investor who can only accept or reject contract proposals
by the entrepreneur. Entrepreneur and investor share initially the same assessment about the
likelihood of success represented by the prior belief ￿0. The funds are supplied by the investor
and the entrepreneur controls the allocation of the funds. She can either invest the funds into the
project or divert the capital ￿ ow to her private ends. We assume that the entrepreneur consumes
any diverted funds immediately, i.e. she cannot accumulate funds in order to ￿nance the project
on her own in the future.5
The time structure in every period t is as follows. At the beginning of period t the entrepreneur
can o⁄er the investor a share contract st and a success probability ￿t ￿ 0. The share st represents
the share of the entrepreneur in the proceeds if the project succeeds in period t. The investor
receives the remaining share 1 ￿ st. The restriction to share contracts is without loss of generality
due to the binary nature of the project. After the contract proposal, the investor can decide whether
to accept or reject the new contract (decision dt). If he accepts the contract, then he provides the
entrepreneur with the requested funds c￿t in period t to support the development of the project.
If he rejects the contract, then a new proposal can be made by the entrepreneur in the subsequent
period. Finally, and conditional on funding, the entrepreneur decides whether to invest the funds
in the project or divert them to her private ends (decision it). The sequence of decisions in every












of 0 or R
t t + 1
Figure 1: Timeline of Events
FIRST Best Policy The project should receive funds as long as current expected returns of the
investment exceed costs:
￿t￿tR ￿ c￿t ￿ 0:
5Alternatively, the same incentive constraints would arise if the e¢ cient investment of the funds would require
costly e⁄ort by the entrepreneur. In this case the entrepreneur evidently cannot save any funds that have not been
invested. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this interpretation. In both cases, one could
imagine that one unit diverted from the funds increases the entrepreneur￿ s utility by a monetary equivalent of only
￿ < 1 units. The smaller is ￿, the less attractive is diversion and hence the less acute is the agency problem that we
study.
8As both return and cost are linear in ￿t, it follows that if investment is socially e¢ cient, it should
occur at the maximal level, or ￿t = ￿. The project should receive its ￿nal investment at the lowest
￿T where the current net return is positive:
￿T￿R ￿ c￿ ￿ 0;
which yields a socially e¢ cient stopping point, described in terms of the posterior belief, at






The social value of the project, denoted by V (￿t), is given by a familiar dynamic programming
equation:
V (￿t) = max
￿2[0;￿]
f￿t￿R ￿ c￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿t)V (￿t+1(￿))g:
The value of the program can be decomposed into the ￿ ow payo⁄s and continuation payo⁄s. The
￿ ow payo⁄s are the returns multiplied by the current probability of success minus the investment
costs. The continuation payo⁄s arise conditional on no success, or with probability (1 ￿ ￿t￿), in
which case the future is assessed at a new posterior, namely ￿t+1. The e¢ cient stopping condition
(2) can be recovered from the dynamic programming equation at ￿T by setting V (￿T+1) = 0.6
The value of the project under the ￿rst best policy can be determined as
V (￿0) = ￿0￿(R ￿ c)
1 ￿ ￿T￿
(1 ￿ ￿)T￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)




where T￿ is the maximal number of periods such that the updated belief after T￿ periods of full
funding is still weakly above ￿￿,or
￿0 (1 ￿ ￿)
T￿
￿0 (1 ￿ ￿)
T￿
+ 1 ￿ ￿0
￿ ￿￿:
3 A Simple Two Period Model
This section presents some basic insights and trade-o⁄s in a simple two period example with t = 0;1.
We compare the funding decision in the symmetric and asymmetric information environment.
6The intertemporally optimal stopping point is thus determined by a static revenue condition. The stopping
point condition does not include any intertemporal element in terms of a value of information, as the posterior belief
(conditional on no success) declines deterministically and thus there is no option value in the evolution of the posterior
belief.
9In this ￿nite horizon setting, we can analyze the contracting equilibrium by backward induction.
We shall start with the symmetric environment. Suppose then that in the ￿nal period, investor
and entrepreneur share a common posterior ￿1 that describes the probability that the project is
good. If the entrepreneur makes a funding proposal (s1;￿1), then the investor will only accept it if
his participation constraint is satis￿ed, or
￿1￿1 (1 ￿ s1)R ￿ c￿1, (3)
and if the incentive constraint for the entrepreneur is satis￿ed as well:
￿1￿1s1R ￿ c￿1: (4)
The incentive constraint simply requires that the expected return from allocating the funds properly
exceeds the value of a diversion. Due to the linear structure of the model, we can safely neglect
partial diversion. In other words, the inequality (4) also guarantees that the incentive constraints
for partial diversion, or
￿1￿1s1R ￿ c￿ + (￿1 ￿ ￿)￿1s1R,
are satis￿ed for all ￿ 2 [0;￿t]. From the participation and the incentive constraints, it follows that
￿nancing is provided only if




We can make a ￿rst observation regarding the social e¢ ciency of the funding decision. We just










Hence equilibrium funding ends too early in comparison with the socially e¢ cient funding policy.
The divergence between equilibrium and social stopping arises from the rent the entrepreneur can
extract due to the non-veri￿ability of his allocation decision.
In equilibrium, the entrepreneur o⁄ers a break-even contract to the investor which solves his
participation constraint (3) at equality, or







The share of the entrepreneur depends on the posterior belief about the quality of the project. Her
expected pro￿t in period t = 1 is given by:
￿1￿1R ￿ c￿1 ￿ 0.
10It follows that she will always suggest a maximal funding level ￿1 = ￿. We can then describe the
expected pro￿t of the entrepreneur as function of the posterior belief ￿1 as follows:
VE (￿1) =
(
￿1￿R ￿ c￿ if ￿1 ￿ 2c
R;
0 if ￿1 < 2c
R:
Going backwards to period t = 0, we ￿nd that the participation constraint of the investor
remains unchanged (except that the posterior ￿1 is replaced by the prior ￿0):
￿0￿0 (1 ￿ s0)R ￿ c￿0:
In contrast, the incentive constraint of the entrepreneur contains an intertemporal element, or
￿0￿0s0R + (1 ￿ ￿0￿0)￿VE (￿1) ￿ c￿0 + ￿VE (￿0). (6)
The lhs of inequality (6) represents the discounted value of the funding proposal (s0;￿0) on the
equilibrium path. If the entrepreneur allocates the funds properly, then the project is successful
with probability ￿0￿0, and an agreed share s0 of the cash ￿ ow R is paid to the entrepreneur. With
the remaining probability, namely 1￿￿0￿0, the project is not successful. In this case, there is still
a chance to realize the project tomorrow. The net value of this option for the entrepreneur is given
by VE (￿1), taking into account the update in the belief to ￿1 following the the failure to succeed
in period 0.
The rhs of the inequality (6) represents the value of a diversion, which now arises from two
sources. First, there is a direct private bene￿t of c￿0, but second, the failure to pursue the project
today, leads to the opportunity to realize it tomorrow. It should be noted that in contrast to the
lhs of the inequality, the opportunity of pursuing the project tomorrow now arises with certainty, as
the diversion of the funds guaranteed that the project could not be realized in period 0. Moreover,
the prior ￿0 is not updated as no information regarding the project was generated in period 0.
By the same argument developed for t = 1, the entrepreneur will o⁄er a break-even contract
with maximal funding to the investor. Using the continuation value VE (￿1), we can write the
incentive constraint of the entrepreneur as follows
￿0￿R ￿ c￿ + (1 ￿ ￿0￿)￿ (￿1￿R ￿ ￿c) ￿ c￿ + ￿ (￿0￿R ￿ ￿c).
The posterior ￿1 is determined via Bayes￿rule (see (1)) as:
￿1 =
￿0 (1 ￿ ￿0)
1 ￿ ￿0￿0
< ￿0, (7)
and after replacing the posterior belief ￿1 in (7), we get the following condition on the prior for
funding over two periods to be possible:
￿0 ￿
2c
R(1 ￿ ￿￿) + ￿￿c
.
11We make several observations. First, for ￿ = 0, the funding condition in period 0 is identical to
the funding condition in period 1, as the entrepreneur acts purely myopically. But for all ￿ > 0, the
funding condition becomes more severe in period 0, as the denominator is a convex combination of
R and c (with R > c). Moreover as ￿ increases, more weight should be given to c and the funding
condition increases in severity. In consequence, it follows that for all ￿0 satisfying:
2c





there will be no equilibrium funding in period 0, though the project will eventually be funded in
period 1. The reason for the equilibrium delay in the funding decision emerges from the incentive
constraint. If the project will get funded anyhow in period 1, the entrepreneur has a strong incentive
to divert the funds in period 0 and thereby guarantee himself further funding and yet maintain
the possibility of success in period 1. This equilibrium delay can only be prevented if the discount
factor is very low, or if the project has a very high probability of success, so that the immediate
rewards outweigh the future bene￿ts.
We consider now the asymmetric environment. Along the equilibrium path, entrepreneur and
investor maintain symmetric information, as the investor uses his equilibrium belief about the
allocation decision of the entrepreneur. The sole di⁄erence arises along the possible deviation of
the entrepreneur, i.e. the o⁄ the equilibrium path decision. Thus if we consider the incentive
constraint of the entrepreneur in period 0, it now reads:




where the only, but important, di⁄erence compared with the symmetric information incentive
constraint (6) arises on the rhs. Following a deviation by the entrepreneur in period 0, the investor
only observes that the project did not succeed and continues to update his prior with the information
coming from the failure to succeed. The investor therefore continues to hold his equilibrium belief
￿1 formed by Bayes rule as in (7). In consequence, he still wishes to be rewarded in period 1
as if the true posterior were ￿1. In contrast, the entrepreneur knows that the belief ￿1 is too
pessimistic since conditional on the funds being diverted in period 0, no new information about the
project arose, and maintains the correct belief ￿0. As the value in period 1 comes from a successful
realization the term ￿0
￿1 corrects the misperception of the investor. In sum, the correct expected
value of the entrepreneur following the diversion of the funds is given by ￿0
￿1VE (￿1). As the true
probability of success is ￿0, but the share is negotiated on the basis of the less optimistic belief
￿1 < ￿0, it follows that:
￿0
￿1
VE (￿1) < VE (￿0),
Since the investor￿ s required value is larger in the arm￿ s length case following the investor￿ s in-
formational handicap, the arm￿ s length environment makes a deviation of the entrepreneur less
12attractive. This e⁄ect, which we call the commitment e⁄ect, is at the heart of our analysis and we
will encounter it extensively in our main analysis. Solving (9) in a manner similar to (8) leads to
the condition that ￿nancing only in the second period is possible if
2c ￿ 1
1￿￿￿￿c






In comparison with the symmetric environment, we ￿nd that the set of prior beliefs without
￿nancing constraints is larger in the asymmetric case, since
2c




R(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ ￿
1￿￿￿￿c
.
Thus, as a consequence of the commitment e⁄ect, more projects will receive immediate funding
in the asymmetric information environment than in the symmetric information environment. Costly
delay is more frequent under symmetric information than under asymmetric information, even
though it may arise in both cases.
This simple two period model generates two important results: (i) it demonstrates the di¢ -
culties in creating e¢ cient investment arrangements when the option of continued future funding
undermines the incentives for current investment and (ii) it shows that asymmetric information
can improve the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium by acting as a commitment device for the investor.
The two period model contains an arti￿cially strong discontinuity regarding the provision of
incentives. In period 0, incentives to invest the funds into the project are weak as further funding
is forthcoming for sure in the period 1. In contrast, in period 1, incentives to invest the funds
are strong as by assumption no further occasions to realize the project arise. This stark contrast
between the periods gave rise to the extreme nature of the equilibrium with no funding in period
0 and maximal funding in period 1. By itself, the two period model thus gives little guidance as
to how the results carry over to a model with a more general time horizon, ￿nite or in￿nite. In
the remainder of the paper, we shall analyze an in￿nite time horizon model and examine the role
of the discount factor ￿ in the equilibrium provision of funds. The removal of the arti￿cial ￿nal
period will lead to the elimination of the discontinuity in the funding volume observed in the two
period model. We will obtain an intertemporal characterization of the funding volume which will
evolve smoothly over time and not only display minimal and maximal funding levels, but typically
intermediate funding at various stages of the project.
4 Relationship Financing
In this section, we analyze contracting with symmetric information, that is the entrepreneur￿ s ac-
tions are observable (but not veri￿able) for the investor. The concept of Markov perfect equilibrium
13is de￿ned in subsection 4. The properties of the Markov perfect equilibrium are investigated in
subsection 4. It is shown in subsection 4 that the Markov perfect equilibrium coincides with the
weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium. Finally, in subsection 4 we discuss how the contracting
results would be a⁄ected if the agents could commit to long-term contracts yet could recontract in
every period.
EQUILIBRIUM In the environment with observable actions, the information of entrepreneur
and investor is symmetric in every period. Formally, we can describe the strategies in the game
as follows. Let Ht denote the set of possible public histories up to, but not including period t. A
proposal strategy by the entrepreneur is given by:
st : Ht ! R; ￿t : Ht ! [0;￿].
A decision rule by the investor is a mapping from the history and the contract proposal into a
binary decision to reject (dt = 0) or to accept (dt = 1):
dt : Ht ￿ R￿[0;￿] ! f0;1g :
Finally, an investment policy by the entrepreneur is given by:
it : Ht ￿ R￿[0;￿] ! f0;￿tg:
The above policies all describe pure rather than mixed strategies and indeed throughout the paper
we focus on pure strategy equilibria. A generic public history of the game is denoted by ht 2 Ht






The evolution of the posterior belief ￿t is not included in the history as it can be inferred from the
sequence of public funding and investment decisions by Bayes￿rule. By default, updating occurs
only conditional on failure of the project as the game ends as soon as the project succeeds and
realizes the return R. Thus given any prior ￿0, an arbitrary history ht uniquely determines the
current posterior belief ￿t = ￿(ht). For a given quadruple fst;￿t;dt;itg
1
t=0 of strategies, denote the
value function of the entrepreneur at the beginning of period t by VE (ht) and the value function
of the investor by VI (ht).
We restrict our attention initially to Markovian equilibria where strategies are allowed to depend
only on the payo⁄-relevant part of the history of the game, which in this model is fully represented
by a single state variable, the posterior belief ￿t in every period t. The Markov equilibrium out-
come is subsequently shown to be identical to a (weakly) renegotiation-proof equilibrium outcome.
Formally, a Markov perfect equilibrium following Maskin and Tirole (2001) is de￿ned as:
14De￿nition 1 (Markov Perfect Equilibrium)








such that the sequence of policies satis￿es 8ht 2 Ht, 8h0
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Thus, a Markov perfect equilibrium imposes the requirement that the continuation play be
identical after any two histories ht and h0





, noting that the
particular history ht may di⁄er from h0
t0 either in its date, t 6= t0, and/or its past actions. Since the
moves in any period are sequential, the relevant state for the investor is not only the belief about
￿t but must also include the entrepreneur￿ s contract o⁄er, and similarly for the entrepreneur￿ s
￿nal capital allocation decision. In the Markovian set-up, we can write the entrepreneur￿ s and the
investor￿ s value functions simply as a function of the current belief, VE (￿t) and VI (￿t), respectively.
ANALYSIS Consider the situation of the investor at an arbitrary point of time. He receives a
proposal by the entrepreneur to fund a project for the current period in exchange for shares in the
proceeds of the project should it succeed in the current period. As the current contract commits
neither investor nor entrepreneur to any future course of action, the investor is willing to accept
the proposal (st;￿t) as long as the expected returns are non-negative, or
￿t (1 ￿ st)￿tR ￿ c￿t: (11)
The inequality then represents the participation constraint of the investor. However, the expected
returns can only materialize if the entrepreneur decides to put the funds to work in the project,
rather than to divert them to her private ends. This is the incentive problem of the entrepreneur.
Consider ￿rst the ￿nal period where the entrepreneur receives funding in equilibrium. This
￿nal period will arise when the belief ￿ = ￿t has deteriorated so much that it will be impossible to
solicit any future funds. In that ￿nal period the entrepreneur has to choose between investing and
diverting, or
￿tst￿tR ￿ c￿t: (12)
Exactly as shown in the two period model above, jointly the inequalities (11) and (12) imply that
for any funding to occur in equilibrium the expected ￿ ow return from the investment must cover
both the cost of the funds for the investor and the opportunity costs for the entrepreneur,
￿t￿tR ￿ 2c￿t:
15The critical posterior belief at which funding will certainly cease is therefore given by ￿S de￿ned
by the identity (5) above, where ￿S is twice as large as the e¢ cient stopping belief, ￿S = 2￿￿.
In all preceding periods, the incentive constraint for the entrepreneur has to take into account
her future opportunities. As in the two period model (see equation (6)), the constraint can be
represented in terms of her value function:
￿t￿tstR + (1 ￿ ￿t￿t)￿VE (￿t+1) ￿ c￿t + ￿VE (￿t): (13)
For any sharing rule st, the entrepreneur can either invest the funds (lhs) or divert them (rhs). She
bene￿ts from complying with the contract via two di⁄erent sources. Either the project succeeds in
period t, giving her a share of the return stR, or it does not succeed, in which case she has access
to future rounds of funding. With a funding ￿ ow of ￿t, the probability of these events are ￿t￿t and
1 ￿ ￿t￿t respectively. If the project fails in the current period, then the posterior belief declines
to ￿t+1. The alternative action for the entrepreneur is to simply divert the funds today and then
face a similar problem tomorrow as the state of the project remains unchanged. Therefore, the
equilibrium can be characterized by a sequence of participation constraints for the investor (as in
(11)) and a sequence of incentive constraints for the entrepreneur (as in (13)).
In equilibrium, the entrepreneur will never leave the investor with more net value than is neces-
sary to obtain the funding. The equilibrium share s￿
t is therefore determined by the exact ful￿llment
of the participation constraint. The investor receives zero net utility when the participation con-






We refer to contracts which leave the investor with zero net utility as break-even contracts and
observe that the break even share is independent of the funding ￿ ow.7 Using (14), we may rewrite
the incentive constraint (13) as:
￿t￿tR ￿ c￿t + (1 ￿ ￿t￿t)￿VE (￿t+1) ￿ c￿t + ￿VE (￿t): (15)
The dynamic incentive constraint shows that the return R has to be su¢ ciently high to cover the
static as well as the dynamic incentive costs. The static part simply says that the gross return
￿t￿tR has to be su¢ ciently large to compensate the investor for his cost c￿t as well as dissuade the
entrepreneur from diverting the current ￿ ow, an additional c￿t. The dynamic part accentuates the
incentive problem. By rewriting (15) as
￿t￿t (R ￿ ￿VE (￿t+1)) ￿ 2c￿t + ￿ (VE (￿t) ￿ VE (￿t+1)), (16)
7We prove the result that only break-even contracts will be o⁄ered in equilibrium formally in Lemma 2 as a
property which holds for all subgame perfect equilibria, and not only for Markovian equilibria.
16it says that the net return for the entrepreneur after paying for the static cost is R ￿ ￿VE (￿t+1)
rather than R itself. This is natural as the success today leads to an end of the project and preempts
future payouts to the entrepreneur. On the other hand even, if the project is funded yet without
success, then the future value of the project is determined by ￿t+1 rather than ￿t. By diverting
the funds, the entrepreneur could escape the downgrade which constitutes the dynamic part of
incentive costs.
A lower level of funding ￿t certainly a⁄ects both sides of the inequality (16), but at di⁄erent
rates. A lower equilibrium level reduces the gains on the lhs but only with the weight ￿t <
1, whereas on the rhs it a⁄ects the current costs of funding, but what is more important the
intertemporal incentive costs. A low funding level ￿t reduces the current value function, VE (￿t),
but a lower ￿t also decreases the di⁄erence between ￿t and ￿t+1 and with it the di⁄erence of
the value functions VE (￿t) ￿ VE (￿t+1). This argument suggests that a marginal decrease in ￿t
always leads to a larger decrease in the rhs of the incentive constraint than the lhs of the incentive
constraint.
Given the impact of the funding rate on the intertemporal incentive constraints, we might then
ask whether it is conceivable that the project receives full funding with ￿t = ￿ until the last period
￿T = ￿S. With period T being the last period of funding, the continuation value at ￿t+1 would be
zero, VE (￿T+1) = 0, and the value function at ￿T would be given by:
VE (￿T) = ￿T￿R ￿ c￿:
But if we inserts these two continuation valuation into the incentive constraint (15) we are lead to
a contradiction as we obtain after rearranging:
￿T￿R ￿ 2c￿ + ￿ (￿T￿R ￿ c￿):
The inequality clearly cannot be satis￿ed at ￿T = ￿S as we have already ￿S￿R = 2c￿ and ￿S￿R￿
c￿ = c￿. This argument already indicates that in equilibrium funding has to (eventually) slow
down from the maximal level ￿ to a lower level ￿t < ￿, which can be sustained by the incentive
constraint (15).
In light of this ￿nding, we might ask whether full funding with ￿t = ￿ will ever occur. To answer
this question, it is helpful to consider the limit case of the incentive constraint (16) with ￿0 = 1,
the case of the ￿certain project￿ . Using the fact that with the certain project, ￿0 = 1, the posterior
beliefs remain constant and equal to the prior beliefs, the intertemporal incentive constraint (15)
can then be written as
￿R ￿ c￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿VE (1) ￿ c￿ + ￿VE (1): (17)
In equilibrium, the value function of the entrepreneur is the discounted and risk adjusted sum of
the per period returns:
VE (1) =
￿R ￿ ￿c
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
:
17We then insert VE (1) into the incentive constraint (17):
￿R ￿ c￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿R ￿ ￿c
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ c￿ + ￿
￿R ￿ ￿c
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
; (18)
and obtain a necessary and su¢ cient condition on R for full funding to occur:




By considering the deviation option of the entrepreneur, the sources of the determination for the
critical value R becomes more transparent. If we consider ￿0 = 1, then if full funding is to occur in
equilibrium, we know that the entrepreneur can always guarantee herself at least c￿ in every period
as a diversion would simply lead to renewed attempts of funding in next period. With ￿0 = 1 and
VE (￿t) = VE (￿t+1), we can rearrange the incentive constraint (17) to read
￿R ￿ 2￿c + ￿￿VE (1). (19)
Now the entrepreneur has the option to divert the funds in every period, which secures him at
least a perpetuity of c￿, hence VE (1) = ￿c
1￿￿. The inequality (19) then states the return from the
project, R, has to cover at least c + c, which are the current costs for entrepreneur and investor,
and the increment in the perpetual rent that is at the discretion of the entrepreneur via his option
to deviate and thereby to increase by ￿ the probability to get access to the perpetual rent. The
rent of entrepreneur thus has a contemporaneous and an intertemporal component.
Condition (￿) turns out to be a key condition in our analysis. A project where the payo⁄ R
is large enough relative to the marginal cost c of success, the contemporaneous rent c and the
increment in the perpetual rent ￿c ￿
1￿￿ so as to satisfy (￿) is termed a ￿high return￿project (in
incentive-adjusted terms), as opposed to a ￿low return￿project where the condition is violated.
De￿nition 2 (Low and high return projects)
The project is a low return project if R < 2c+￿c ￿
1￿￿ and it is a high return project if R ￿ 2c+￿c ￿
1￿￿.
We can now ask what happens to equilibrium funding when the critical inequality (￿) is violated.
Staying with the special case of the certain project and hence ￿0 = 1, the solution is almost apparent
from the analysis of the incentive constraint (17). For funding to occur, the incentive constraint
has to be reestablished again. This requires that the rent arising from a diversion is lowered, which
can only mean that the funding level is lowered to an appropriate level ￿￿
t < ￿. In fact, we can
obtain the equilibrium funding ￿t = ￿￿
t by solving the incentive constraint (18) as an equality. The
solution ￿￿
t to the equality (18) is also the unique equilibrium funding level. While it is by now
clear that a funding level above ￿￿
t could not be sustained in equilibrium, we shall now argue that
any funding level strictly lower than ￿￿
t could not form an equilibrium either. We observe ￿rst
18that if the funding level is set below ￿￿
t then the incentive constraint (17) would again hold as a
strict inequality. As the entrepreneur then has slack in his incentive constraint, he could ask the
investor for a higher funding level, even ￿, by ￿bribing￿the investor and o⁄ering him a slightly
larger share of the surplus than the break-even contract. The investor would agree as he would
be o⁄ered a strictly positive net surplus, and given the continuation values, he would be assured
that the entrepreneur￿ s incentive constraints still holds. In consequence, an interior level of funding
￿ 2 (0;1) can be sustained in equilibrium only if the incentive constraint of the entrepreneur is
met as an equality. The insight that an interior level of funding is always associated with a binding
incentive constraint is of course not restricted to ￿t = 1, but valid more generally for all ￿t ￿ 1.
We summarize the equilibrium funding decisions for the certain project.
Theorem 1 (Certain Project)
1. If the certain project has high returns, then it receives full funding in all periods.





(R ￿ 2c) < ￿, 8t.
The equilibrium funding level of the low return project is increasing in the ￿nal value R and
decreasing in cost c. An increase in the discount factor ￿ increases the value of the option to divert
and hence the investor responds in equilibrium by a decelerating the ￿ ow of funds as it becomes
more di¢ cult to satisfy the incentive constraint.
The equilibrium in the general case of an evolving ￿t can now almost be conceived by replacing
the constant value R by the dynamically evolving value ￿tR. As long as ￿tR is su¢ ciently large,
unrestricted funding will be possible, yet as ￿tR decreases, funding will have to decrease as well so
as to maintain the incentive constraint of the entrepreneur.
The critical value of the posterior belief, denoted by ￿, at which funding will become restricted
can in fact easily be obtained. Under the hypothesis that the value function of the entrepreneur is
just equal, but not larger, than the perpetual rent that the entrepreneur can secure by deviating
forever, the incentive constraint allows to solve for the value function as




The critical posterior belief is then computed by solving (15) with the continuation values given by
the perpetual rents, or
￿￿R ￿ ￿c + (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿
￿c
1 ￿ ￿




19from which we can infer the threshold as
￿ =
2c
R ￿ ￿c ￿
1￿￿
: (20)
Full funding at ￿t is possible if and only if ￿t ￿ ￿. We can summarize our ￿ndings as:
Theorem 2 (Relationship Funding)
The Markov Perfect Equilibrium is unique and funding is always provided until ￿T = ￿S.
1. If the project has low returns, then it receives restricted fundingin all periods.
2. If the project has high returns, then it receives full funding for all ￿t ￿ ￿ and restricted
funding for all ￿t < ￿.
3. If funding is restricted, then ￿t is strictly decreasing in t.
The sharing rule associated with the equilibrium is given by (14). For high return projects,
there is a critical value ￿ such that the project will receive maximal funding as long as ￿t ￿ ￿.
Low return projects which have insu¢ cient returns to cover current costs and perpetual rents, even
at ￿t = 1, are then always subject to restricted funding. In both cases, the volume of funding will
decrease over time with the deterioration in the expected returns ￿tR.
RENEGOTIATION-PROOF Equilibrium The notion of a Markov equilibrium imposes a
stationarity requirement on the o⁄er and acceptance decisions of the agents. In the context of our
model, the Markovian assumption has a natural interpretation as a consistency requirement on the
process of (re)negotiation between the two parties; namely, the Markovian condition requires that
entrepreneur and investor ￿nd an arrangement mutually acceptable whenever they have found the
same arrangement acceptable in the past and absent any new information about the nature of the
project.
We now strengthen this intuition by considering arbitrary history-dependent policies instead.
However, we impose a condition that the policies must be time-consistent in the sense that if the
players can coordinate on a certain policy in a subgame, they are also able to coordinate on the
same policy in any other subgame where the circumstances are the same, that is if they share the
same belief about ￿t. In other words, we assume that they are able to avoid any Pareto-inferior
outcome under exactly the same circumstances. To this end, we invoke the re￿nement of weakly
renegotiation-proof equilibrium ￿rst suggested by Farrell and Maskin (1989) for repeated games.
The adaptation of the equilibrium notion to dynamic games is straightforward.
De￿nition 3 (Weakly Renegotiation-Proof)






t=0 is weakly renegotiation-proof if there do not exist
20continuation equilibria at some ht and h0





and ht 6= h0











, with at least one strict inequality.
The renegotiation considered here occurs between time periods. It is conceptually di⁄erent
from renegotiation in static principal-agent models as considered by Fudenberg and Tirole (1990)
or Hermalin and Katz (1991). The notion of weakly renegotiation-proof is often interpreted as an
internal consistency requirement. Indeed, Farrell and Maskin (1989) suggested a strengthening of
the notion by de￿ning as strongly renegotiation-proof any weakly renegotiation-proof pro￿le with
none of its continuation equilibria being strictly Pareto dominated by another weakly renegotiation-
proof pro￿le. This distinction is immaterial to our argument, as they all coincide in this sequential
move game with symmetric information.
Theorem 3 (Equivalence)
The unique Markov perfect equilibrium is identical to the unique weakly renegotiation-proof equilib-
rium.
The equivalence can be illustrated by the following simple example of equilibrium strategy
pro￿les which form a subgame perfect, but not renegotiation-proof equilibrium. The example also
shows that renegotiation-proofness indeed imposes restrictions on the equilibrium set:
(i) The entrepreneur o⁄ers in each period break-even contracts and invests funds if her private
value to invest exceeds her private value to divert. If the investor has observed no deviations in
the past, then the investor provides maximal funding if he breaks at least even and can expect the
entrepreneur to invest. He rejects any contract proposal which doesn￿ t meet the above conditions.
(ii) If there were any deviations in the past then entrepreneur and investor pursue the stationary
equilibrium strategies as described earlier.
Consider these strategy pro￿les for a certain project, ￿0 = 1, with low returns, R < 2c+￿c ￿
1￿￿.










In contrast, suppose part (i) of the strategy pro￿le forms indeed a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Then the value for the entrepreneur would be
^ VE (1) =
￿R ￿ ￿c
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
.
21As it is immediately veri￿ed that o⁄er and acceptance strategies in (i) have the best response
property if the entrepreneur subsequently invests, it remains to verify her incentive constraint,
which can be written as:
￿R ￿ ￿c
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ c￿ + (R ￿ 2c);
which leads after the obvious cancellations to




This is precisely the condition of low returns that we imposed for this example. Thus, the outlined
strategy pro￿le would allow full funding everywhere along the equilibrium path by relying on the
stationary equilibrium as an o⁄-the-equilibrium punishment path. The strategy pro￿les rely in
an obvious way on continuation plays which are not renegotiation-proof. As the investor receives
zero utility on and o⁄ the equilibrium path, it is su¢ cient to note that the entrepreneur receives
di⁄erent values on and o⁄ the equilibrium path to ￿nd that the strategy pro￿le is not weakly
renegotiation-proof.
BARGAINING and Long-Term Contracts We have so far imposed two strong assumptions
on the structure of contracts, namely (i) that all the bargaining power rests with the entrepreneur
and (ii) that only short-term contracts were possible. Here, we brie￿ y discuss the robustness of
the results if we were to relax either of the assumptions.
Bargaining Power. Consider ￿rst a change in the bargaining power. Suppose that the investor
now makes all contract o⁄ers and the entrepreneur accepts or rejects all proposals. Still, the
participation constraint of the investor and the incentive constraint of the entrepreneur have to
hold in any equilibrium. As long as both constraints are binding, they uniquely determine the
equilibrium. In the model, both constraints were binding in the region ￿t < ￿; where only reduced
funding was feasible. Therefore, nothing would change in this region with the redistribution of the
bargaining power: The pattern of funding and the distribution of the surplus remains the same.
A change in the allocation can only arise if one of the inequalities is not binding any more, and
the change would then pertain to the distribution of the surplus. Now in the benchmark model,
the incentive constraint was only slack in the region of optimistic posterior beliefs ￿t ￿ ￿. But
there, maximal funding was guaranteed anyhow, and a shift in bargaining power would not alter
that. It follows that the funding pattern in equilibrium would remain una⁄ected by a change in
the bargaining power.
Long-Term Contracts. In this paper, we analyze short-term contracts in which the participation
constraint of the investor has to hold in every period. Consider then an extension of the contracting
space to allow for long-term contracts that are valid for any arbitrary horizon of T periods. We
maintain our requirement that existing contracts can be renegotiated or new contracts be concluded
22in every future period. Formally, this allows us to substitute the sequence of participation con-
straints that had to be met in every period by a single intertemporal participation constraint that
has to hold only at the time of entry into the contract. In contrast, the sequence of period-by-period
incentive constraints needs to be maintained, as they guarantee the proper allocation of investment
funds in every period.
The advantages of a long-term contract reside naturally with a possible intertemporal smooth-
ing of the entrepreneur￿ s expected payo⁄s. More precisely, it is then possible to reallocate the
entrepreneur￿ s payo⁄ stream over time so as to make it coincide with the stream that is necessary
to guarantee incentives. Thus, in every moment where the project￿ s current net cash ￿ ow (￿tR￿c)￿
exceeds what is needed to maintain the entrepreneur￿ s incentives, or as long as ￿t > ￿, there is a
surplus that can be reallocated. The entrepreneur concedes a larger share to the investor today in
exchange for receiving a larger share herself in the future. Conversely, the investor makes pro￿ts
initially in return for a commitment to subsidize the project later on, when ￿t falls below ￿.
Hence, for high return projects with an optimistic prior belief, ￿0 > ￿, a long-term contract
can strictly improve upon the allocation of short-term contracts. The region where full funding
is provided can then be extended beyond the threshold ￿. The funding pattern, however, would
remain as before, insofar as the project would receive initially full funding and then switch to lower
funding levels. By contrast, we observe that as soon as funding is reduced, our previous argument of
the intertemporal smoothing e⁄ect of long-term contracting never applies and long-term contracts
can do no better than short-term contracts. Therefore, if ￿0 ￿ ￿, which is always the case for low
return projects, there is no role for long-term contracts and the equilibrium is una⁄ected by the
larger set of feasible contracts. The reason is that the project then has in no instance high enough
returns to generate surplus beyond participation and incentive constraints. The details are spelt
out in an earlier version of the current paper (Bergemann and Hege, 2000).
5 Arm￿ s Length Financing
In this section we assume that the investment decision by the entrepreneur is unobservable by
the investor. We ￿rst consider Markovian equilibria, to maintain consistent equilibrium conditions
across di⁄erent informational structures. A Markov sequential equilibrium is de￿ned in Subsection
5, and the equilibrium analysis is presented in Subsection 5. It is then shown in Subsection 5 that
the Markovian restriction is immaterial as the unique Markov sequential equilibrium coincides with
the unique sequential equilibrium. In Subsection 5, we discuss again the robustness when changes
in the bargaining power or long-term contracts are introduced.
EQUILIBRIUM As we consider the contracting problem with unobservable actions by the
entrepreneur, the observable history of the game begins to di⁄er for entrepreneur and investor.
23The entrepreneur still observes all past realizations of the strategic choices and a private history ht






The investor, however, is not able to observe the action of the entrepreneur anymore. Along any






Denote by ^ Ht the set of all possible such histories. In consequence, the evolution of the posterior
belief may di⁄er for entrepreneur and investor. We continue to denote by ￿t the entrepreneur￿ s
posterior belief based on the history ht, ￿t , ￿(ht). We refer to the belief that the investor
holds at time t and after observing the restricted public history ^ ht as ^ ￿t , ^ ￿(^ ht), which will
depend on the observed history ^ ht as well as on the investor￿ s belief about the entrepreneur￿ s
past investment behavior, f^ {0;:::;^ {t￿1g. By Bayes￿law there is a one-to-one relationship between
the estimate regarding the entrepreneur￿ s past investments f^ {0;:::;^ {t￿1g and the belief about ^ ￿(^ ht).
The estimate regarding f^ {0;:::;^ {t￿1g depends on the incentives provided through the past and future
share contracts fs0;::::;st;:::g. As before, updating occurs only conditional on current failure of
the project as the game ends as soon as the project succeeds.
As entrepreneur and investor observe di⁄erent histories, the payo⁄ relevant part of the history
is now represented by two state variables, the two (possibly di⁄erent) posterior beliefs about the
likelihood of success, ￿t and ^ ￿t. The suitably adapted Markovian equilibrium concept can then be
stated as:
De￿nition 4 (Markov Sequential Equilibrium)
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The Markovian sequential equilibrium ensures that the continuation strategies are time-consistent
and identical after any history with an identical pair of rationally updated beliefs, ￿t and ^ ￿t. The
Markovian restrictions contained in (21) are equivalent to the ones formulated earlier in (10), with
the exception that the underlying histories and beliefs di⁄er for entrepreneur and investor.
24ANALYSIS Before we go to the details of the analysis, it might be useful to describe intuitively
where the di⁄erences in the equilibrium incentives arise and how they matter for the equilibrium
funding. Conditional on receiving the funds, the entrepreneur still has the option to either invest
or divert the funds. The di⁄erences arises in how entrepreneur and investor evaluate these di⁄erent
options. Clearly, the investor is only willing to provide the funds if he is convinced that the funds
will be directed to the project. Consider then the counterfactual of a diversion of the funds by the
entrepreneur. Following a deviation, the entrepreneur would know that the funds didn￿ t bene￿t
the project and hence a failure of the project to succeed in this period will not surprise her at all.
In contrast, for the investor, a deviation remains a counterfactual and thus he is downgrading his
beliefs about the future value of the project as the current failure induces a downward change in
his beliefs. Thus, a deviation, as an o⁄-the-equilibrium behavior by the entrepreneur, leads to a
divergence in the posterior about the future likelihood of success. More precisely, the entrepreneur
maintains her estimate ￿t+1 = ￿t whereas the investor continues to update his belief to a lower
value ^ ￿t+1 < ￿t. Such a divergence of beliefs per se could not arise in the environment with
observable actions.
How does the possibility of divergent beliefs in￿ uence the equilibrium incentives? Ultimately
the divergence imposes more discipline on the funding decisions of the investor and therefore tends
to ease the funding problem. As a deviation will still lead to a lowering in the posterior belief of
the investor, he will ask for a larger share of the return R. This leads directly to higher cost of
obtaining funds from the point of view of the entrepreneur. The option of delaying the investment
decision until the next period thus becomes less attractive.
We examine next how these changes will be re￿ ected in the participation and incentive con-
straints. The participation constraint of the investor remains unchanged at:
^ ￿tst￿tR ￿ ￿tc;
with the exception that it is evaluated at ^ ￿t rather than ￿t. The modi￿cation is immaterial along
the equilibrium path, as ￿t = ^ ￿t. However the incentive constraint of the entrepreneur changes to
re￿ ect the divergence of the beliefs o⁄ the equilibrium path. Formally, the incentive constraint is
given by:






where, momentarily, we express the value function as determined by both beliefs. We observe that
o⁄-the-equilibrium path, the posterior belief of entrepreneur and investor diverge and hence the
value function o⁄ the equilibrium path depends on the speci￿c belief of the entrepreneur, ￿0
t+1
and the investor, ^ ￿t+1. Along the equilibrium path, the entrepreneur invests the funds into the
project, and a diversion occurs o⁄ the equilibrium path. The continuation value conditional on a
diversion is therefore described by two di⁄erent beliefs, the correct belief ￿0
t+1 of the entrepreneur
25and the incorrect belief ^ ￿t+1 of the investor. After a one-period deviation, the o⁄-the-equilibrium
path belief of the entrepreneur, ￿0
t+1, is simply given by ￿0
t+1 = ￿t, whereas the investor holds the
￿equilibrium￿belief ^ ￿t+1 = ￿t+1. Hence, o⁄-the-equilibrium path, the investor will only accept
contracts which will break-even under his posterior belief ^ ￿t+1 and all subsequent updates of his
posterior. How then does this a⁄ect the continuation value of the entrepreneur o⁄-the-equilibrium
path? The answer is rather straightforward. It will be as if his continuation value would be indeed
be determined by the belief of the investor ^ ￿t+1 = ￿t+1, but as the entrepreneur privately knows
that the true posterior, conditional on diversion, is still given by ￿t, he simply exchanges the
posterior belief ^ ￿t+1 = ￿t+1 of the investor by his own ￿0
t+1 = ￿t. This allows us to relate the o⁄










After all, the value function of the entrepreneur, on and o⁄ the equilibrium path, is simply the
discounted sum of success probabilities, or













After we replace the conditional success probabilities ￿t+2￿t+2; ￿t+3￿t+3;::: by the unconditional








we can rewrite the value function (23) as a sequence of unconditional probabilities:















that only invoke the current belief ￿t+1 and the current and future ￿ ow probabilities ￿t+1;￿t+2;￿t+3;:::.
This shows how the identity (22) arises. The terms of the contract, namely st+1;st+2;::: are con-
ditional on a deviation of the entrepreneur are determined by the belief of the investor. In conse-
quence, the accepted shares conditional on the deviation, will be identical to the shares the parties
would agree upon on the equilibrium path as ^ ￿t+1 = ￿t+1, hence the term VE (￿t+1). But pri-
vately, the entrepreneur knows that the true probability of future success is ￿t rather ￿t+1. Hence
the ratio term ￿t
￿t+1 corrects for the fact that the value function VE (￿t+1) underestimates the true
probability of success when ￿0
t+1 = ￿t.
We can therefore rewrite the incentive constraint in the asymmetric information environment
as follows:




26The reader may realize that the lhs of the inequality, which represents the ￿on-the-equilibrium
path￿behavior remains identical to the one in the observable environment (cf. expression (13)).
The change occurs on the rhs of the inequality, or the ￿o⁄-the-equilibrium path￿ . The ￿ ow value of
a diversion still contains the immediate bene￿t of c￿t. But as the investor continues to believe that
an investment occurred, he will only accept future proposals as if an investment today had indeed
occurred. In consequence, the value function of the entrepreneur will have to evolve (almost) as if
the current failure had to be attributed to the project rather than the diversion of the entrepreneur.
There is one bene￿t, however, for the entrepreneur from the continued updating. She will know that
the true probability is still ￿t rather than ￿t+1. Thus instead of multiplying the future probability
of success with ￿t+1 she is certain that it is indeed ￿t.
The intertemporal incentive constraint (25) may be rewritten after cancelling the obvious terms
as:




In general then, funding towards the end of the lifetime of the project will become easier with an
arm￿ s length relationship. But now a complementary problem may arise at the beginning of the
project. If indeed funding will be generous close to the end of the project, then the entrepreneur
may have less incentives at the beginning of the project to invest funds, as the future will o⁄er
plenty of opportunities to generate success. Thus an easing of the incentive constraint near the
end of the project may tighten the incentive constraint at the beginning of the project, when the
assessment in terms of the beliefs ￿t is still very positive. This indicates that the monotonicity in
the funding volume may indeed be reversed with unobservable actions. We ￿rst state the results
and then comment on some of the equilibrium properties. The threshold posterior belief at which








Theorem 4 (Arm￿ s Length Funding)
The Markov Sequential Equilibrium is unique and funding stops at ￿T = ￿S.
1. If the discount factor is low, ￿ < 2￿2￿
2￿￿ , then
(a) a low return project receives restricted funding at all times,
(b) a high return project receives full funding for ￿t ￿ ￿ and restricted funding for ￿t < ￿.
2. If the discount factor is high, ￿ ￿ 2￿2￿
2￿￿ , then
(a) a low return project receives restricted funding for ￿t > ￿ and full funding for ￿t < ￿,
27(b) a high return project receives full funding at all times.
The di⁄erence in the equilibrium funding policies between arm￿ s length and relationship ￿-
nancing are now easily discussed. For low discount factors, or ￿ < 2￿2￿
2￿￿ , the equilibrium funding
over time displays exactly the same dynamics under arm￿ s length and relationship funding. Yet, a
di⁄erence emerges for high discount factors, or ￿ ￿ 2￿2￿
2￿￿ . The absence of a commitment problem
with arm￿ s length funding completely restores the e¢ ciency of the funding decision until ￿T = ￿S
for a high return project. For a project with low returns, it at least allows to reestablish funding
e¢ ciency close to ￿S. The above condition on the discount factor can be restated symmetrically








For convenience, we shall henceforth refer to large and small discount factors depending on whether
￿ does or does not satisfy condition (￿￿).
De￿nition 5 (Small and large discount factors)
The discount factor is said to be small if ￿ < 2￿2￿
2￿￿ and it is said to be large if ￿ ￿ 2￿2￿
2￿￿ .
We observe that an increase in the winning probability ￿ leads to lower bound on the discount
factor and vice versa. The role of the discount factor, or for that the winning probability should not
come entirely as surprise given our earlier discussion on the ine¢ ciencies in relationship funding.
The lack of commitment became especially damaging to the social e¢ ciency of the equilibrium
when the discount factor was high, the intertemporal rent of the entrepreneur liable to be high and
the only equilibrium resolution of this con￿ ict required the investor to slow down the release of the
funds. As the informational asymmetry allows the investor to overcome this lack of commitment,
the discrepancy between arm￿ s length and relationship funding arises precisely where arm￿ s length
funding was most a⁄ected by the lack of commitment. The e¢ ciency is thus reestablished for high
return project and improves the funding volume for low return projects with high discount factors.
Corollary 1 (Funding Evolution)
1. If the discount factor is small, then the funding volume is decreasing over time.
2. If the discount factor is large, then the funding volume is increasing over time.
Whether funding will eventually become unrestricted as ￿t is su¢ ciently close to 1, is again
determined by the high return condition: R ￿ 2c + ￿￿
1￿￿c we encountered earlier in the symmetric
environment. The reappearance of the condition is plausible as for ￿t su¢ ciently close to one, the
di⁄erences in the beliefs of entrepreneur and investor after a deviation become arbitrarily small as a
28current failure barely changes the very optimistic view of the investor. More precisely, for any ￿xed












converges to zero when the initial belief at ￿t is arbitrarily optimistic about the likelihood of eventual
success. The asymmetry in the information between entrepreneur and investor is thus arbitrarily
small when the incoming belief ￿t is close to 1 and in consequence the asymmetric contracting
problem becomes arbitrarily close to the symmetric contracting problem. These arguments can be
retraced formally by comparing the two incentive constraints, the symmetric incentive constraint
(see (15)):
￿t￿tR ￿ c￿t + (1 ￿ ￿t￿t)￿VE (￿t+1) ￿ c￿t + ￿VE (￿t);
and the asymmetric incentive constraint (see (25)):




We now observe that as ￿t ! 1, we have
lim
￿t!1





By continuity of the value function, it then follows from the above that
lim
￿t!1
(VE (￿t) ￿ VE (￿t+1)) = 0;
and hence symmetric and asymmetric incentive constraints become identical as ￿t ! 1. Moreover,
as ￿t ! 1, the posterior beliefs will change for a long period of time only very slowly as the funds
fail to generate a success. This means that for a long period of time, symmetric and asymmetric
incentive conditions will almost be identical and hence the value generated through them will be
very close to each other as the more distant events matter less due to discounting.
SEQUENTIAL Equilibrium The characterization of the equilibrium seemed to rely strongly
on the Markovian assumption. In particular, we represented the incentive problem of the entrepre-
neur through a Bellman equation. But there is one crucial di⁄erence to relationship ￿nancing: As
the investor continues to lower his belief every time he provided funds yet did not observe success,
he reaches the posterior belief ￿S after ￿nitely many positive funding decisions. This is true on
the equilibrium path as well as o⁄ the equilibrium path. Thus, in contrast to the symmetric en-
vironment, the horizon of the game e⁄ectively becomes ￿nite. This allows us to analyze the game
by backwards induction over a ￿nite horizon. As the (static) equilibrium in any ￿nal period where
29￿T ￿ ￿S, yet ￿T+1 < ￿S, is unique, we can then construct the equilibrium recursively. More-
over the stage game has a unique equilibrium for any given continuation payo⁄. In a sequential
equilibrium, the investor￿ s beliefs ￿(^ ht) are tied down according to Bayes￿rule after all possible
histories, including o⁄ the equilibrium histories, which is su¢ cient to guarantee the uniqueness of
the continuation equilibrium everywhere. It follows that backwards induction leads to a unique
sequential equilibrium independent of the Markov assumption.8
The construction of the equilibrium in Theorem 4 is thus in fact constructing the unique se-
quential equilibrium, where the posterior belief ￿t merely serves to summarize the beliefs of the
players for a given history, but not as a restriction on the conditioning of the strategies.
Corollary 2 The unique Markov sequential equilibrium is the unique sequential equilibrium.
Thus, since the equilibrium play in a sequential equilibrium always follows a ￿nite horizon logic
in the environment with unobservable actions, there is no need to refer to any formal concept of
renegotiation-proofness in order to make sure that the outcome is the one that we have in mind,
where it is impossible throughout to ￿nd a Pareto-improving continuation play by rescinding the
equilibrium contracts.
BARGAINING and Long-Term Contracts As before, we may ask how sensitive the equi-
librium results are to the speci￿cs of the contracting model, in particular the distribution of the
bargaining power and the restriction to short-term contracts.
Bargaining Power. Suppose now that the investor makes all the o⁄ers and the entrepreneur
can only respond with acceptance or rejection. With a small discount factor, the equilibrium
funding pattern is qualitatively comparable to the one under symmetric information and changes
in bargaining structure do not at all e⁄ect the funding volume. With a large discount factor, the
funding pattern remains in its qualitative properties but the equilibrium displays less ine¢ ciencies.
The reason is that whenever funding is unrestricted, the project￿ s expected cash ￿ ow leaves some
free surplus after participation and incentive constraints are satis￿ed. The question is then whether
a better overall allocation is achieved if this surplus is distributed to the investor rather than the
entrepreneur. Giving the surplus to the investor means a lower expected equilibrium payo⁄ for
the entrepreneur. Recall that the minimum value of the entrepreneur that guarantees incentive
compatibility is recursively constructed. Thus, a lower expected compensation in the future (since
the free surplus is given to the investor) translates into a lower option value of diverting and hence
into a lower minimum compensation today. The incentive problem of the entrepreneur in the
current period is eased. In consequence, a change in the bargaining power would allow an increase
8Perfect Bayesian equilibrium cannot be used here since adverse selection is a consequence of the entrepreneur￿ s
unobservable actions, not of chance moves of nature.
30of the area where maximal funding is provided and would increase the volume of funding over the
entire horizon.
Long-Term Contracts. The reasons why there can be bene￿ts from adopting (renegotiation-
proof) long-term contracts are closely related. As long-term contracts replace the ￿ ow participation
constraint of the investor with a single initial constraint, intertemporal smoothing is possible. With
a large discount factor, the project is initially constrained, and a free surplus arises towards the
end of the relationship. As discussed for changes in the bargaining power, allocating this surplus to
the investor lowers the entrepreneur￿ s expected future value, and hence eases the current incentive
problem. Moreover, in return for making expected pro￿ts towards the end, the investor can agree
to subsidize the project elsewhere, i.e. to provide full funding while accepting a current share
(1 ￿ st)￿t￿R that falls short of the investment ￿ ow c￿. The question is then when to schedule
this subsidy phase. The answer is that this subsidy phase should be scheduled as soon as possible,
but the requirement that the equilibrium be immune to renegotiation is an e⁄ective constraint on
this. As a consequence, if the project has low returns, the intertemporal smoothing arrangement
will allow an early start and an extension of the ￿nal phase where full funding can be provided,
but only limited funding is possible initially. If the project has high returns, then full funding is
possible from the start and can be continued even beyond ￿S.
By contrast, with a small discount factor, the dynamics of the funding pattern is reversed
and resembles roughly the picture with observable actions. The project is constrained towards
the end, necessitating to slow down the release of funds. The intertemporal smoothing option of
long-term contracts allows to prolong the initial full funding phase. But as soon as the surplus is
exhausted, the optimal contract reverts back to the sequence of contracts described above, with the
same funding volume. For low return projects or if ￿0 is so small that short-term contracts never
allow for full funding, then there is never a surplus to redistribute intertemporally and long-term
contracting cannot improve upon short-term contracts. For details and formal statements, we refer
again to an earlier version of this paper (Bergemann and Hege, 2000).
6 Observability and the Commitment to Stop
In the previous two sections, we gave separate accounts of the environment with observable actions
and with unobservable actions. We provide a comparison of the two cases in this section which
we interpret to re￿ ect the initial choice between relationship ￿nancing and arm￿ s length ￿nancing
when the project is set up.
We will conduct this comparison by maintaining the assumption that, once the ￿nancing mode
is chosen, the investor is committed to the informational environment throughout. The source of
this commitment is not explained in the model, and we will informally discuss possible transition
from one funding mode to the other at the end of this section.
31The immediate bene￿t of relationship funding is the absence of private information during the
development of the relationship. It means in particular that the design of the contract does not
have to account for the extraction of private information. It thus circumvents the learning rent
which is associated with the private information. We have shown above that under relationship
￿nancing, three di⁄erent components of rents must be awarded to the entrepreneur to make her
willing to invest and risk early success, namely the contemporaneous rent equal to the immediate
gain in consumption that a deviation a⁄ords, the intertemporal rent to compensate for the option
to receive sure continued ￿nancing when deviating, and ￿nally the learning rent driven by the fact
that only the entrepreneur knows whether something has actually been learned about ￿t or not.
By contrast, there were only two of these components present in the case of relationship ￿nancing,
since there was no need for the learning rent.
The (implicit) cost of the relationship funding resides with the ability of the entrepreneur to
restart the relationship after she diverted funds in previous periods. As the investor can￿ t commit
himself to refuse a contract with positive net payo⁄s, the entrepreneur was essentially able to extract
a rent equivalent to an in￿nite stream of funds ￿c; worth ￿c ￿
1￿￿. In contrast, the asymmetry in the
arm￿ s length relationship reduces the ability of the entrepreneur to renegotiate at favorable terms
and hence weakens the incentives for the entrepreneur to delay investment into the project.
With this basic trade-o⁄ between the two funding modes, we ￿nd that the possible cost of an
arm￿ s length relationship, namely the learning rent, is small in comparison to the bene￿t from
commitment. Therefore, we arrive at the following result.
Theorem 5 (Comparison)
For all posterior beliefs ￿t the funding volume is larger under arm￿ s length than under relationship
￿nancing.
To gain more insight into this result, it is helpful to discuss separately the case of a low and high
discount factor. With a small discount factor, we showed earlier that the funding pattern decreases
in both informational environments. We then show that for all posterior beliefs ￿t, the funding
volume is higher with arm￿ s length funding. With a large discount factor, we have shown that the
evolution of the funding levels displays opposite signs: ￿t is (weakly) decreasing in t with observable
actions, but it is increasing in t with unobservable actions. Here, in order to show that arm￿ s length
funding always occurs at a higher volume than with relationship funding, it is su¢ cient to compare
the initial equilibrium funding volume, which again can be shown to be higher with arm￿ s length
funding.
The clear Pareto-ranking between the two ￿nancing modes is a rather striking result. From a
naive point of view, it may appear counterintuitive since it says that the ￿nancing mode with an
informational asymmetry separating ￿nancier and entrepreneur is more e¢ cient. While it is well-
known that asymmetric information may o⁄er advantages in a principal-agent model (see CrØmer,
321995), our analysis shows that this argument is particularly prevalent when the agency relationship
is open-ended and the agent has the option to extend it over a very long horizon.
The dynamic model shows that the relative advantage of arm￿ s length funding increases over
time. In the beginning, there may be no di⁄erence between the speed with which funds can be
released, especially for high return projects. But as projects become protracted and prospects
become relatively poor, arm￿ s length funding eventually o⁄ers an increasing advantage compared
with relationship funding, which does not o⁄er a commitment to stop at a given time and therefore
allows the entrepreneur to threaten an in￿nite series of deviations even when only few pro￿table
rounds of experimentation are left. As bargaining power shifts to the investor, the advantage of
arm￿ s length contracts towards the end of the projects increases even further.
The typical ￿nancing cycle of business start-ups involves close relationships with ￿nanciers early
on, and this is exempli￿ed by the activity of venture capitalists who not only provide capital, but
also monitor the projects very closely and get involved as advisors (see Gompers and Lerner 1999,
Casamatta 2003). There is evidence that the value of relationship funding decreases over the typical
￿nancial cycle of an innovative ￿rm: for example, in venture funded projects, syndicates tend to
grow and to include more uninformed investors later on (Hege, Palomino and Schwienbacher, 2003).
There are also empirical ￿ndings that, in banking relationships, ￿nanciers assume a more passive
role over time (e.g., Smith and Ongena, 2001). As projects mature and require more capital, while
having more tangible assets and research results to o⁄er, their funding sources tend to become
more diverse: funding typically starts with equity-dominated venture ￿nancing and adds more and
more debt-like instruments, like mezzanine ￿nancing, over time as the ￿rm grows and its funding
needs expand (Berger and Udell, 1998). Thus, even before a successful technology start-up reaches
￿nancial maturity and is funded by genuine outside investors, such as dispersed shareholders or
bondholders, many ventures go already through a process of gradually decreasing the reliance on
relationship ￿nanciers. This pattern is consistent with the comparison of the two funding modes in
our model which lends support to the notion that the ￿nancial cycle of innovative projects evolves
from more to less informed investors.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we present a dynamic agency model in which time and outcome of the project wis
uncertain. The model prominently features three aspects which together are de￿ning elements for
a wide class of agency problems of research and development activities: (i) the eventual returns
from the project are uncertain, (ii) more information about the likelihood of success arrives with
investment into the project, and (iii) investor and entrepreneur (innovator) cannot commit to
future actions. The analysis focuses on Markovian equilibria, but we showed that this is a rather
mild or even immaterial restriction in the context of the model. The equilibrium analysis proceeds
33sequentially, starting with symmetric information and ending with asymmetric information. The
funding level was determined endogenously and depends on the returns of the project, the discount
factor and the informational asymmetry between entrepreneur and investor.
The impatience of the entrepreneur is an important determinant in the volume of funding as
the severity of the incentive constraint increased with the discount factor. This is in contrast to
the results in the theory of repeated moral hazard games, where discount factors close enough to
one often allow the equilibrium set to reach the e¢ ciency frontier. In addition, we showed that the
recursive structure of the incentive constraint leads to distinct funding dynamics under asymmetric
information, where with large discount factors, the incentive constraint tends to actually relax over
time and allow a larger funding rate as the projects approaches its terminal period.
The basic trade-o⁄ between arm￿ s length and relationship ￿nancing revealed in this paper is
that arm￿ s length ￿nancing o⁄ers the advantage that the investor is implicitly committed to a
￿nite stopping horizon, while relationship ￿nancing saves up on the learning rent since investor and
entrepreneur update beliefs symmetrically.
Finally, some possible extensions of our model should be mentioned. First, a worthwhile exten-
sion is to consider the equilibrium behavior when there are competing projects, formed by di⁄erent
entrepreneurs. As competition may limit the rent of each entrepreneur, parallel research for an
identical objective might be an arrangement that improves e¢ ciency despite the inevitable dupli-
cation of R&D e⁄orts. In a winner-takes-all competition the threat of preemption by a competitor
will limit the intertemporal rent of each entrepreneur. Similarly, launching competing research
teams may increase the ex ante value for an organization despite the multiplication of research
e⁄orts.
Second, it is conceivable that the entrepreneur may initially own some, perhaps small, invest-
ment funds. We then might ask how inside and outside funds are optimally mixed over time. We are
con￿dent that a delayed use of the entrepreneur￿ s equity can be shown to be optimal in some cases.
This should notably be the case if the entrepreneur￿ s funds help alleviate ￿nancing constraints when
the promise of the project deteriorates, as it is typically the case under relationship ￿nancing. The
open-horizon principal-agent model developed here should allow us to analyze the relative merits of
these di⁄erent incentives tools and their role in mitigating the contracting problems of compounded
information rents.
348 Appendix
Lemma 1 In every SPE no funding occurs for ￿t < ￿S.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium with
funding in period t, or





















￿t￿tR ￿ 2c￿t < 0. (A3)
As entrepreneur and investor can always guarantee themselves at least a zero lifetime utility by
o⁄ering contracts without funding (i.e. ￿t = 0) and by refusing all other contracts, respectively, it
follows that
VE (ht) ￿ 0; VI (ht) ￿ 0
for all histories ht and all periods t. A necessary condition for the validity of (A1) and (A2) is
therefore
￿t￿tstR ￿ ￿tc + (1 ￿ ￿t￿t)￿VE (ht+1) ￿ 0; (A4)
and
￿t￿t (1 ￿ st)R ￿ ￿tc + (1 ￿ ￿t￿t)￿VI (ht+1) ￿ 0: (A5)
Under the hypothesis of (A3), it follows that at least one of the agents, entrepreneur or investor,
must incur a loss in period t in exchange to a strictly positive continuation utility in period t + 1,
and from (A4) and (A5), we can infer that
VE (ht+1) + VI (ht+1) ￿
2c￿t ￿ ￿t￿tR
￿ (1 ￿ ￿t￿t)
> 0. (A6)
It follows that entrepreneur and investor jointly expect to be compensated for the current loss in
the future. Yet, due to discounting and the possibility of a positive realization the current loss
translates in higher present value gains starting from tomorrow. But future gains can only be
generated from the value of the project, yet since ￿t is decreasing over time, (A3) implies that
￿t+1￿t+1R ￿ 2c￿t+1 < 0,
35and a repetition of the same argument allows us to infer that by forwarding (A6) by one period,
we obtain the following condition







2c￿t+1 ￿ ￿t+1￿t+1R +
2c￿t ￿ ￿t￿tR
￿ (1 ￿ ￿t￿t)
￿
> 0,
and by induction on t, we then come to the conclusion that the value functions of the entrepreneur
and investor are growing without bounds as t ! 1, which delivers the desired contradiction as the
sum of the value functions has to be ￿nite as the value of the project is ￿nite.
Lemma 2 In every SPE only break-even contracts have a positive probability of being accepted.
Proof. Suppose in equilibrium a contract (st;￿t) is o⁄ered and accepted. Then it has to satisfy:


















We ￿rst show that in every equilibrium and at every t:
st ￿ ￿ st.
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that the equilibrium contract is given by st < ￿ st. It then




which is more advantageous for the entrepreneur must be rejected by the investor. It follows that















as the value function along the equilibrium path satis￿es VI (ht+1) ￿ 0. Consider then the contin-
uation equilibrium starting at h00
t+1. It follows that starting at t + 1, the investor must be o⁄ered
some contracts with strictly positive net value to him to generate the strictly positive continuation
payo⁄. Yet, again for him to reject all lower o⁄ers by the entrepreneur, it must be that his outside

























and thus by induction we ￿nd a sequence of continuation games in which the equilibrium value
of the investor grows without bound, which leads to the desired contradiction, as the value of the
game is ￿nite and the value of the entrepreneur is guaranteed to be nonnegative.
It remains to discuss the case of st ￿ ￿ st. As st ￿ ￿ st for all t, it follows that VI (ht) = 0 for all
ht. In this case, the intertemporal participation constraint (A7) of the investor becomes
￿t￿t (1 ￿ st)R ￿ ￿tc ￿ 0;
which can only be satis￿ed with
st = ￿ st;
for all t, which is the desired conclusion.
Proof of Theorem 2. (1.) and (2.) The incentive constraint for the entrepreneur in period t is
given by:
￿tst￿tR + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t￿t)V (￿t+1) ￿ c￿t + ￿V (￿t):
The participation constraint for the investor is given by
￿t (1 ￿ st)￿tR ￿ c￿t: (A8)
The participation constraint is always binding and the sharing rule is given by:




The incentive constraint for the entrepreneur becomes:
￿t￿tR ￿ c￿t + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t￿t)V (￿t+1) ￿ c￿t + ￿V (￿t);
and if funding is constrained in ￿t, the incentive constraint is binding with:
￿t￿tR ￿ c￿t + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t￿t)V (￿t+1) = c￿t + ￿V (￿t): (A9)





and the indi⁄erence condition leads to a di⁄erence equation determining the equilibrium funding
￿t:
￿t￿tR ￿ c￿t + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t￿t)
c￿t+1
1 ￿ ￿




37Suppose initially that ￿t = ￿ and ￿t+1 < ￿, then it must be that













It follows that a necessary and su¢ cient condition for maximal funding is given by
￿t￿R ￿ ￿c + (1 ￿ ￿t￿)￿
c￿
1 ￿ ￿


















we obtain the distinction between low and high return projects. It follows that for all ￿t < ￿,
￿t < ￿, as the funding volume has to be lowered. By the same argument, there is maximal funding
for ￿t ￿ ￿.
(3.) We proceed by contradiction in two steps. We ￿rst show that if ￿ (￿) were to be decreasing
in ￿ on some segment, then it can only occur for




We then argue by contradiction that even if R satis￿es inequality (A11), ￿ (￿) has to be increasing.
To this end, we rewrite the di⁄erence equation (A10), using the fact that
￿t =
￿t+1





















(1 ￿ ￿t): (A12)
For an arbitrary and ￿xed ￿t+1 and ￿t+1, we then investigate the nature of the solution for ￿t. The
rhs of the equality (A12) is linear in ￿t. The lhs is convex function of ￿t, initially decreasing, zero
at ￿t = ￿t+1, displaying a minimum at ￿t = p￿t+1 and remaining negative thereafter. It follows















(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0: (A13)























(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0;











From this we can infer that ￿t+1 > ￿t requires




We proceed by contradiction using again the di⁄erence equation (A10), which is now valid
everywhere (for all ￿t) by the earlier argument. Consider ￿rst the rhs of (A10). We ￿rst show that



































as the agent cannot receive more than the gross value of the project. Next suppose there is an
increasing segment, or ￿t ￿ ￿t+1, then it follows from the above property and the lhs of the
di⁄erence equation that ￿t+1 < ￿t+2. It follows that if funding is weakly increasing at some time
segment t and t+1 it will be strictly increasing thereafter. Further if we view the di⁄erence equation
as function expressing ￿t+1 in dependence of ￿t , then for a ￿xed ￿t it is a convex function and
hence ￿t+2 ￿ ￿t+1 > ￿t+1 ￿ ￿t. As ￿t is decreasing over time, this makes the di⁄erence equation
even more increasing. It follows that if the function is not monotonic decreasing, then it must be
increasing at an increasing rate, but this leads to the desired contradiction as funding has to be
lower than ￿ < 1 everywhere by virtue of (A14).
Proof of Theorem 3. ()) It is a direct implication of the de￿nition of the MPE that the
equilibrium value functions of the players depend only on the payo⁄-relevant state of the game.
The set of equilibrium values at any ￿ is therefore a singleton for every player and it follows that
any MPE is also a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium.
39(()We ￿rst show that every weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium has to be an MPE. The
uniqueness of the weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium then follows from the uniqueness of the
MPE. We ￿rst observe that every weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium is a subgame perfect
equilibrium. By Lemma 2, it is then su¢ cient to consider break-even contracts. This implies that
the value function of the investor is equal to zero along every continuation path, or VI (ht) = 0
for all ht. By De￿nition 3 of the weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium, it then follows that the
equilibrium value function of the entrepreneur has to take on the same value for any two histories,
ht and hs, which generate the same posterior belief. In other words, for all ht and hs, we have
￿(ht) = ￿(hs) ) VE (ht) = VE (hs). (A15)
Consider then the incentive constraint of the entrepreneur in any subgame perfect equilibrium in
period t:






By Lemma 2, we can restrict our attention to break even contracts, which leads to






By the earlier argument, represented by the implication (A15), the posterior belief ￿ has to be
su¢ cient statistic for the history ht with respect to the value function of the entrepreneur, and
hence
￿t￿tR ￿ ￿tc + (1 ￿ ￿t￿t)￿VE (￿t+1) ￿ c￿t + ￿VE (￿t): (A16)
It is immediate from here, that every weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium must also be a MPE
as it satis￿es the equilibrium conditions of the MPE. But as the MPE is unique by Theorem 2, it
follows that the weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium is unique as well.
Proof of Theorem 4. We characterize the equilibrium funding through a sequence of Lemmata.
Lemma 3 establishes necessary and su¢ cient condition for restricted and unrestricted funding at
￿T = ￿S. Lemma 4 establishes the switching point from restricted to unrestricted funding and
establishes the di⁄erence equation which governs the equilibrium funding as it is restricted. Lemma
5 establishes properties of the ￿xed point and thereby the areas where funding is restricted and
unrestricted. Lemma 6 establishes the monotonicity of the funding volume as a function of time.
Lemma 3 The equilibrium funding volume at ￿T = ￿S is given by









40Proof. We consider the ultimate ￿T and penultimate prior beliefs ￿T￿1 with ￿T = ￿S. We begin
with (A17). Consider the incentive constraint (26) evaluated at the penultimate period, T ￿ 1:




We can express ￿T￿1 in terms of ￿ and ￿T :
￿T￿1 =
￿T
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿T)
and rewrite (A19) as
￿T
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿T)
￿R ￿ 2c￿ + ￿
1
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿T)
￿VE (￿T). (A20)
By hypothesis ￿T = ￿S, and hence
VE (￿T) = ￿T￿TR ￿ c￿T = c￿T. (A21)
Inserting the value (A21) into the incentive constraint (A20), we obtain after rewriting:
￿(1 ￿ ￿T)2c ￿ ￿c￿T. (A22)
The incentive constraint (A22) is most di¢ cult to satisfy if ￿T is chosen maximally, i.e. ￿T = ￿.
Using the fact that ￿T = ￿S = 2c
R, we get
￿(R ￿ 2c)2 ￿ ￿R￿,
which can be written as
R(2 ￿ ￿) ￿ 4c. (A23)
Using the fact that we distinguish between low and high return projects, we can express the
inequality (A23) in terms of ￿ and ￿ exclusively. For suppose that


















41On the other hand for


















Thus, it follows for R ￿ 2c + c￿￿
1￿￿ as well as for R < 2c + c￿￿
1￿￿, that ￿ ￿ 2￿￿
2￿2￿ is a necessary and





then for (A22) to hold: ￿T < ￿. ￿
Lemma 4 The equilibrium switching point is given by:
￿ =
2c ￿ 2 c￿
1￿￿ + c ￿￿
1￿￿
R ￿ 2 c￿
1￿￿
:
Proof. We ￿rst derive the di⁄erence equation for the investor￿ s funding decision, provided that
the incentive constraint of the entrepreneur is binding. The beliefs of entrepreneur and investor are
symmetric along the equilibrium path. In consequence, the contracts on the equilibrium path are
the break-even contracts and satisfy:
￿t￿tstR = ￿t￿tR ￿ c￿t. (A24)
The value of the entrepreneur along the equilibrium path can then be represented as:
VE (￿t) = ￿t￿tR ￿ c￿t + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t￿t)VE (￿t+1): (A25)
We can now directly consider the recursive incentive problem of the entrepreneur. The incentive
constraint of the entrepreneur changes to re￿ ect the divergence of the beliefs o⁄ the equilibrium
path. It is given by:




Since 1 ￿ ￿t￿t = ￿t
￿t+1 (1 ￿ ￿t), the incentive constraint may be rewritten as:




















VE (￿t) = (￿tR ￿ 2c) + c￿t (A28)
Forwarding (A28) for one period and equating to (A27) yields











￿t leads to the di⁄erence equation:
￿t+1 = 2 +
￿
















Making use of the backwards expression of the belief ratios, ￿t
￿t+1 = 1
￿t+1￿t+(1￿￿t) and solving, we














where we observe that ￿t is a linear increasing function of ￿t+1.
The equilibrium switching point ￿ is given by the unique ￿ which results in a ￿xed point of the
di⁄erence equation ￿ = f (￿;￿) at full funding level:
￿ =
2c ￿ 2 c￿
1￿￿ + c￿￿
1￿￿
R ￿ 2 c￿
1￿￿
;
which completes this lemma.￿
Lemma 5
1. The switching point ￿ satis￿es ￿ 2 (￿S;1) if either
(a) R ￿ 2c + c￿￿
1￿￿ and ￿ < 2￿2￿
2￿￿ , or
(b) R < 2c + c￿￿
1￿￿ and ￿ ￿ 2￿2￿
2￿￿ .
2. The switching point satis￿es ￿ = 2 (￿S;1) otherwise.
Proof. The proof is omitted as it simply requires the algebraic veri￿cation of the conditions stated
in Lemma 5 applied to the switching point ￿.￿
43Lemma 6
1. If ￿ < 2￿￿
2￿2￿, the funding volume ￿t is decreasing over time.
2. If ￿ ￿ 2￿￿
2￿2￿, the funding volume ￿t is increasing in time.
3. The monotonicity is strict in either case provided that ￿t < ￿.
Proof. To describe the monotonicity properties of the di⁄erence equation it is useful to analyze
the ￿xed point of the mapping: ￿ = f (￿;￿), for all ￿ < ￿. It is given by
￿ (￿) =
(￿R ￿ 2c) 1￿￿
￿ ￿
2￿ ￿ 21￿￿




The ￿xed point ￿ (￿) has a derivative which leads to:









We start with ￿ < 2￿￿
2￿2￿ and show that the di⁄erence equation ￿t must be strictly decreasing in time
t. The argument is by contradiction. Suppose then there exists t and t + 1 such that ￿t ￿ ￿t+1,
then it follows by the property of the ￿xed point as a function of ￿, as displayed in (A30), and the
fact that ￿t is linear increasing in ￿t+1, as displayed in (A29) that ￿s￿1 < ￿s for all s < t. The




















and ￿0 is bounded by ￿0 2 [0;￿], it follows that that the expression in brackets in (A32) has to go










As ￿t is supposed to be a local maximum, it follow from (A29) that an upper bound for ￿t is
obtained by setting ￿t+1 = ￿t, or
￿t ￿
(R￿t+1 ￿ 2c) 1￿￿
￿ ￿
2￿t+1 ￿ 21￿￿




44Yet, we ￿nd that
(R￿t+1 ￿ 2c) 1￿￿
￿ ￿
2￿t+1 ￿ 21￿￿
















which leads to the desired contradiction. Thus there is no local maximum either, and hence,
￿t ￿ ￿t+1 for all t.
Consider next the case of ￿ ￿ 2￿￿
2￿2￿. We argue as above by contradiction. Suppose there is a
segment t and t+1 such that ￿t > ￿t+1. Then it follows again from the ￿xed point property, (A31),
that for all s ￿ t, ￿s￿1 ￿ ￿s. As ￿ 2 (￿S;1), it further follows that there must be at least one local
minimum, say at ￿t. For the local minimum at ￿t, we obtain a lower bound by setting as above
￿t+1 = ￿t,
￿t >
(R￿t+1 ￿ 2c) 1￿￿
￿ ￿
2￿t+1 ￿ 21￿￿




The rhs presents the value of the ￿xed point ￿ (￿), which is decreasing by (A30). The lower bound
is therefore lowest for ￿t+1 = 1, from which it follows that the local minimum ￿t must satisfy
￿t >




yet as it is a local minimum it has to satisfy














the conditions (A35) and (A36) lead to a contradiction.￿
Proof of Corollary 2: It is immediately veri￿ed that the derivation of the Markov sequential
equilibrium above only relied on a backward induction argument. In the construction of the equi-
librium the belief ￿t merely served to summarize the information of the players but never to restrict
the history contingency of the strategies employed by the agents.
Proof of Theorem 5: Denote by ￿s
t and ￿a
t the funding volume in the symmetric and asymmetric





45If in addition, R ￿ 2c + ￿c ￿
1￿￿ then ￿a
t = ￿ everywhere, and thus the condition ￿a
t ￿ ￿s
t for all ￿t,
with strict inequality in the ￿nal periods, is satis￿ed. For R < 2c + ￿c ￿
1￿￿, we know by Theorem
2, that the funding volume ￿s
t is increasing in ￿ and by Theorem 4 that the funding volume ￿a
t is
(weakly) decreasing in ￿. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for ￿a
t ￿ ￿s





t) ￿ 0. (A37)
For the symmetric information case, condition (A10) in the proof of Theorem 2 can be solved as















As we solve the respective di⁄erence equations, (A38) and (A29) from the proof of Theorem 4, for
















which establishes the validity of (A37).





where by Theorem 2 and 4 ￿a
t and ￿s
t are both increasing in ￿. We proceed by establishing a lower
bound on ￿a
t and an upper bound on ￿s
t, denoted by ￿a
t and ￿s
t, respectively. We then show that
￿a
t ￿ ￿s
t, completing the result. As ￿a
t ￿ ￿a
t￿1 in this case, a lower bound ￿a
t is established by
looking for the ￿xed point ￿a
t￿1 = ￿a









2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t) 1
￿
. (A39)
Considering then the di⁄erence equation of the symmetric environment (A38) and using the fact
that by hypothesis ￿s
t￿1 ￿ ￿s
t in (A38), we obtain an upper bound: Comparing (A39) and (??)
and requiring that ￿a
t ￿ ￿s


























which holds for all ￿t ￿ ￿S.
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